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Abstract. Ontologies are notoriously hard to define, express and reason
about. Many tools have been developed to ease the ontology debugging
and reasoning, however they often lack accessibility and formalisation. A
visual representation language, concept diagrams, was developed for ex-
pressing ontologies, which has been empirically proven to be cognitively
more accessible to ontology users. In this paper we answer the question
of “How can concept diagrams be used to reason about inconsistencies
and incoherence of ontologies?”. We do so by formalising a set of infer-
ence rules for concept diagrams that enables stepwise verification of the
inconsistency and incoherence of a set of ontology axioms. The design
of inference rules is driven by empirical evidence that concise (merged)
diagrams are easier to comprehend for users than a set of lower level
diagrams that are a one-to-one translation from OWL ontology axioms.
We prove that our inference rules are sound, and exemplify how they can
be used to reason about inconsistencies and incoherence.
1 Introduction
Ontologies are sets of statements that represent individuals, classes and their
properties, typically expressed using symbolic notations such as description log-
ics (DL) [3] and OWL [1]. Although ontologies are widely used for knowledge
representation in domains involving diverse stakeholders, the languages they are
expressed in are often inaccessible to those unfamiliar with mathematical nota-
tions. To address this shortcoming some ontology editors, such as Prote´ge´ [2],
provide visualisation facilities. Instead of using diagrams as an auxiliary tool
to aid comprehension and accessibility, like in Prote´ge´, some have taken one
step further by using a logic that is fundamentally diagrammatic (e.g., [4, 7]).
However, these diagrammatic notations are either informal [4] or do not fully
exploit the potential of formal diagrammatic notations (e.g., [7]). The design of
concept diagrams [14] for expressing ontologies is based on cognitive theories of
what makes a diagrammatic notation accessible, in particular to novice users [5].
Concept diagrams are extensions of Euler diagrams and, in addition to closed
curves for set representation, they use dots (spiders) and arrows for individuals
and properties, respectively.
⋆ This research was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Research Project Grant (RPG-
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Similar to traditional logical systems, concept diagrams are equipped with
inference rules which are used for specifying, reasoning and evaluating ontologies.
Evaluating ontologies involves debugging them of inconsistencies and incoher-
ence [12] before they can be published. These, so-called antipatterns, capture the
unintended model-instances of an ontology [6, 9]. An inconsistent ontology is one
that cannot have any model and, so, entails anything [11], whereas an incoherent
ontology is one that entails an unsatisfiable (i.e., empty) class or property. In
other words, from an incoherent ontology we can infer that there exists a class
or a property that is unsatisfiable (i.e., empty).
Empirical evidence proves that for incoherence checking, novice users not
only perform significantly better with concept diagrams than with OWL [1] or
DL [3], but also that merging concept diagrams (corresponding to each ontology
axiom) into a single diagram makes them easier for humans to reason with [13].
This result coincides with cognitive evidence [18] that humans often mentally
merge the representations of axioms into one when checking for inconsistency
and incoherence.
In this paper, we formalise the use of concept diagrams for reasoning about
inconsistencies and incoherence in ontologies by defining inference rules that
merge axioms into a concise and cognitively more accessible concept diagram.
We base our design of inference rules on empirical evidence that concise (merged)
diagrams are easier to comprehend for users than a set of lower level diagrams
that express equivalent information [13]. We prove that our concept diagrams in-
ference rules are sound and exemplify how they can be used to spot inconsistency
and incoherence.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of the
syntax and semantics of concept diagrams, followed by Section 3 that introduces
how concept diagrams are reasoned with. In Section 4 we review the related
work and finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Concept Diagrams
This section presents the syntax and semantics of concept diagrams [19]. We start
with an example in Figure 1. This concept diagram has the following syntax and
semantic interpretation:
– One dot – called a spider – which represents a named individual, Sara;
– Two boundary rectangles (represented by ◻) each of which represents the
universal set.
– Eight curves, representing eight sets, six of which have labels (e.g., People).
The two curves without labels represent anonymous sets. The spatial rela-
tionships between curves and spiders within a boundary rectangle convey
semantics. For example, the syntax within the LHS rectangle says that Sara
is in the set Children; Children is a subset of People; the sets Poeple and
Drinks are disjoint; and Alcoholic drink set is a subset of Drinks.
– Shading (e.g., intersection of Alcoholic and the unlabelled curve inside Drink)
which is used to place upper bounds on set cardinality: in a shaded region,
all elements are represented by spiders. Since there are no element in this
particular shaded region, the region is empty.
– Two arrows, one of which is solid and the other one is dashed. Arrows are
used to convey semantics about binary relations, using their sources and
People
Sara
drinks
Drinks
AlcoholicChildren has   1
Ingredients
Sugar
Fig. 1: A concept diagram.
targets. A solid arrow asserts that things in arrow’s source are only related
to things in arrow’s target under a certain relation (e.g., Children only drink
Drinks and only thoes Drinks that are not Alcoholic.). A dased arrow asserts
that things in arrow’s source relate to things in arrow’s target amongst other
things. The dashed arrow here, is sourced on Drinks and targets an unlabelled
curve. This unlabelled curve, say c, represents a subset of Ingredients (which
could be Sugar or some other Ingredients) to which members of Drinks are
related under has relation. The dashed arrow’s annotation, ≥ 1, places a
constraint on set Drinks: all elements of Drinks must be related to at least
one element of c under has Relation.
2.1 Syntax
When using concept diagrams for ontology representation, ontology classes, indi-
viduals in classes, and object properties, are respectively represented by curves,
spiders and arrows. These require labels. Therefore, we start by defining three
pairwise disjoint sets, LS (for identifying particular individuals), LC (for par-
ticular classes), and LA (for object properties), which are, respectively, sets of
names for spiders, curves and arrows. Informally, in concretely drawn diagrams
(as opposed to their sentential abstract representation), spiders and curves are
allowed to be unlabelled, as seen in Figure 1. Formally, however, these unla-
belled entities act as variables. As such, we define two further pairwise disjoint,
countably infinite sets (also disjoint from the former three), VS (for anonymous
individuals), VC (for anonymous classes) which are variables for spiders and
curves respectively. In drawn concept diagram, we typically omit labels for vari-
ables to avoid clutter. However, if the same anonymous spider or curve appears
more than once, so that the variable label is used on more than one spider or
curve, then this label must be drawn. Further, we define LA− = {op− ∶ op ∈ LA},
allowing us to denote inverse properties.
At the abstract level, concept diagrams include a set of spiders that are
chosen from a countably infinite set, S. In a drawn diagram, each spider is a tree
whose nodes are placed in distinct zones (i.e., dots connected by lines placed
in ‘minimal’ regions in the diagram). Any two spiders may be joined by Ô , to
assert that two individuals are the same. For example, if s in Figure 1 was joined
to, say s′ (i.e., s Ô s′), they would be the same individual. Also, Ô may
be annotated with ? (i.e.,
?Ô ) to indicate uncertainty about equality: the two
spiders may represent either equal or distinct individuals.
Concept diagrams also include closed curves, selected from a countably infi-
nite set, C. The closed curves give rise to zones that are regions inside some or
none of the curves. Formally, a zone is a pair of finite, disjoint sets of curves,(in,C/in), where C ⊆ C is a finite set of curves. Intuitively, (in,C/in) is inside
every curve of in ⊆ C and outside every curve of C/in. For example, in Figure 1,
both LHS and RHS diagram components have five zones.
Arrows are another component of concept diagrams. At the abstract level,
arrows are of the form (s, t, ○) and all of them are labelled. Here, s is the arrow’s
source, t is the target and ○ is either → or ⇢. Arrows can be sourced on the
boundary rectangle, curves or spiders. Arrow labels can be object properties, or
their inverses. Arrows can also be assigned labels that express minimum, maxi-
mum and equality cardinality constraints. These labels are written on arrows in
diagrams as ≤ n, ≥ n and = n; formally they are ordered pairs, such as (≤, n).
Prior to defining concept diagrams, we define class and object property dia-
grams (Definition 1) that are the main building blocks of concept diagrams, and
allow assertions to be made about classes and object properties of an ontology
in a universe (i.e., within a boundary rectangle).
Definition 1 (Class and object property diagram). A class and object
property diagram, χ = (S,C,Z,Z∗, η, τ=, τ?,A, λs, λc, λa, λ#) consists of:
1. S ⊂ S that is a finite set of spiders;
2. C ⊂ C that is a finite set of curves;
3. Z that is a set of zones such that Z ⊆ {(in,C/in) ∶ in ⊆ C}.
4. Z∗ ⊆ Z that is a set of shaded zones;
5. η ∶ S → P(Z)/{∅} that is a function that returns the location of each spider.P(Z) represents the set of subsets (i.e., powerset) of Z, and since the habitat
of a spider has to be a non-empty set of zones, we remove ∅ from P(Z);
6. τ= that is a reflexive, symmetric relation on S that identifies whether two
spiders are joined by an equals sign; (s1, s2) ∈ τ= means that s1 is joined to
s2 by Ô (indicating they are the same);
7. τ? that is a reflexive, symmetric relation on S, disjoint from τ=. It identifies
if two spiders are joined by
?Ô ; (s1, s2) ∈ τ? means s1 is joined to s2 by ?Ô
(indicating that s1 and s2 may or may not be equal);
8. A that is a finite multiset of arrows such that for all (s, t, ○) in A, s and t
are in S ∪C ∪ {◻}, where ◻ is a boundary rectangle;
9. λs ∶ S → LS ∪ VS that is a function that maps spiders to spider labels;
10. λc ∶ C → LC ∪ VC that is a function that maps curves to curve labels;
11. λa ∶ A → LA ∪ LA− that is a function that maps arrows to arrow labels or
their inverses.
12. λ# ∶ A → (≤,=,≥) ×N that is a partial function that maps arrows to cardi-
nality constraints.
We write S(χ) to denote the set of spiders in χ and so forth for the other sets.
We are now in a position to define concept diagrams. A concept diagram
(Definition 2), is a set of class and object property diagrams, possibly with
additional arrows that have a source inside one boundary rectangle and a target
inside another. Again, the labels for these additional arrows are chosen from LA
and they may be annotated with cardinalities.
Definition 2 (Concept Diagram). Concept diagram d = (COP,Ao, λo, λ#),
has components defined as follows:
1. COP is a finite set of class and object property diagrams such that for any
pair of distinct diagrams, χi and χj, in COP, S(χi)∩S(χj) = ∅ and C(χi)∩
C(χj) = ∅.
2. Ao is a finite multiset of arrows such that for all (s, t, ○) in Ao,
(a) s ∈ ⋃
χ∈COP S(χ)∪C(χ)∪({◻}×COP) and t ∈ ⋃χ∈COP S(χ)∪C(χ)∪({◻}×COP), and
(b) for all diagrams, χ, in COP it is not the case that s ∈ S(χ) ∪ C(χ) ∪{(◻, χ)} and t ∈ S(χ) ∪C(χ) ∪ {(◻, χ)},
3. λo ∶ Ao → LA ∪ LA− is a function that maps arrows to object property and
their inverses,
4. λ# ∶ Ao → {≤,=,≥} ×N is a partial function that maps arrows to cardinality
constraints.
Note that, item 2 of this definition guarantees that the set of arrows in Ao
have their source and targets in two different rectangles (e.g., has in Figure 1).
In other words, these arrows are different from the set A in class and object
property diagrams, when the source and target of the arrows are within the
same rectangle (e.g., drinks in Figure 1).
2.2 Semantics
We take a standard approach to defining the semantics of concept diagrams.
First, the vocabulary over which the logic is defined is interpreted appropriately
(Definition 3), which is the basis for our definition of a model for a concept
diagram (Definition 5).
Definition 3 (Interpretation). An interpretation is a pair, I = (U, .I),
where
– U is a non-empty set, called the universal set,
– for each element i in LS , iI is an element of U ,
– for each element c in LC, cI is a subset of U ,
– for each element op in LA, opI is a binary relation on U .
We also need to interpret the variables and zones in class and object property
diagrams. To do so, we first extend interpretations to variables.
Definition 4 (Extended Interpretation). Given an interpretation, I = (U, .I),
an extended interpretation is a pair, I ′ = (U, .I′), such that
– for each element x in VS , xI′ is an element of U , and
– for each element X in VC, XI′ is a subset of U .
Definition 5 (Model). 3 Let d = (COP,Ao, λo, λ#) be a concept diagram and
let I = (U, .I) be an interpretation. I is a model for d if there exists an extended
interpretation, I ′ = (U, .I′), such that
1. for each class and object property diagram χi, in COP
(a) the union of the sets represented by the zones in χ is U , that is ⋃
z∈Z(χ) zI
′ =
U , where each zone z = (in,C/in) represents the set zI′ = ( ⋂
κ∈in λc(κ)I′)/( ⋃
κ∈C/in λc(κ)I′);
3 For simplicity and succinctness, we treat single elements as singleton sets (e.g. a
spider represents an element via its label, but we treat it as a singleton set).
(b) each shaded zone in χ represents a set containing only elements mapped
to by spiders in χ, that is zI
′ ⊆ ⋃
σ∈S(χ){λs(σ)I′};
(c) for each spider, σ, in χ, λs(σ)I′ is an element in the set denoted by one
of the zones in which σ is placed;
(d) any two spiders, σ1 and σ2, in χ not joined by Ô map to distinct ele-
ments, that is λs(σ1)I′ ≠ λs(σ2)I′ ;
(e) any two spiders, σ1 and σ2, in χ joined by Ô but not annotated with ?
map to the same element, that is λs(σ1)I′ = λs(σ2)I′ ;
(f) for each solid arrow, aj, with source s, target t and label op, the image
of opI when the domain is restricted to the set represented by s, equals
to the set represented by t;
(g) for each dashed arrow, aj, with source s, target t and label op, the image
of opI when the domain is restricted to the set represented by s, is a
superset of the set represented by t;
(h) if an arrow is annotated with cardinality constraint, (◇, n), then each
element of the source set is related to ◇n elements in the target set, and
2. for each connecting arrow, aj, in Ao with source in χi and target in χj,
(a) if aj is a solid arrow with source s, target t and label op, the image of
opI when the domain is restricted to the set represented by s, equals to
the set represented by t;
(b) if aj is a dashed arrow with source s, target t and label op, the image
of opI when the domain is restricted to the set represented by s, is a
superset of the set represented by t;
(c) if aj is annotated with a cardinality constraint, (◇, n), then each element
of the source set is related to ◇n elements in the target set.
Let D be a set of concept diagrams. Then I is a model for D if I is a model for
each concept diagram in D.
3 Reasoning with Concept Diagrams
Similar to traditional logical systems, concept diagrams are equipped with in-
ference rules. Reasoning with concept diagrams involves using different kinds of
inference rules including first-order logic rules (e.g., substitution [5]), pure dia-
grammatic rules (e.g., Delete Syntax, see Section 3.1), and rules that combine
information from two diagrams. In what follows, we first mention the existing
inference rules for concept diagrams. Next, based on existing rules, we introduce
inference rules that are tailored for merging concept diagrams and thus support
inconsistency/incoherence checking tasks.
3.1 Existing Inference Rules
Here we briefly mention the set of sound inference rules devised for concept
diagrams in the past [5]. They are applicable to the fragment of concept diagrams
we characterised in Section 2. Figure 2 exemplifies the inference rules we are later
on using in the examples in this paper. Rules are displayed in two dimensions,
for instance, d1 d2
d3
R shows rule R with premises d1 and d2 and conclusion d3.
– Delete Syntax (del): this inference rule removes syntax from a diagram.
Fig. 2: Inference rules from [5].
– Copy Spider (c): this rules copies a spider in a curve from diagram d1 to d2,
where d2 contains the same curve with no spider.
– Copy Curve 1 (cc1): this inference rule copies curve C from diagram d2 to
d1, where both diagrams contain curve B, while C is a curve containing B
only in d2.
– Copy Curve 2 (cc2): this inference rule copies curve B from diagram d2 to
d1, where both diagrams contain spider s2 and s2 is in curve B in d2 only.
In addition, concept diagrams are a superclass of spider diagrams [8], thus we
inherit all of the inference rules for spider diagrams. Due to space limitation, we
refer the readers to [20] for details.
3.2 Incoherence and Inconsistency
We begin by defining what it means for D, a set of concept diagrams representing
axioms in ontology o, to be incoherent and inconsistent [17].
Definition 6 (Incoherence). A set of concept diagrams, D, is incoherent, if
one of the following conditions is met:
– there is a label, A, in LC such that for all models, I = (U, .I), for D AI = ∅,
– there is a label, op, in LA such that for all models, I = (U, .I), for D opI = ∅,
Such empty labels are called unsatisfiable.
To prove that ontology o is incoherent, we have to show that a class or
an object property is unsatisfiable (i.e., empty). When using a set of concept
diagrams, D, to define o, the task is thus to prove a lemma of the form:
(i) a curve labelled A necessarily represents an empty class, or
(ii) an arrow labelled op necessarily represents an empty object property.
A lemma of type (i) is proved if, carrying out the proof visually, we derive a
diagram in Figure 3a: an entirely shaded region with no spiders represents the
empty set in any model. Type (ii) lemmas are proved if the proof derives a
diagram in Figure 3b, in which the target of the arrow is entirely shaded with no
spiders: this target represents the empty set, implying the image of op is empty,
thus op is an empty relation.
For example, the left inference rules in Figure 4 spot an incoherence by show-
ing that A is unsatisfiable. We have that the universal image of op is restricted
to B, while there is set A such that the partial image of A under op includes C.
However, C and B are disjoint. Since the universal image of op is restricted to B,
the image of A under p cannot be outside B, which is clearly not the case here.
So A is empty. The right inference rule shows that object property op is empty,
because the first premise displays the image of op as a subset of intersection of
B and C, while the second premise defines B and C as disjoint.
(a) A is empty. (b) op is empty.
Fig. 3: Representation of incoherence in concept diagrams.
Fig. 4: Incoherence examples.
We now define what it means for a set of concept diagrams to be inconsistent.
As we proceed, we also adopt ⊥ as a canonical representation of inconsistency.
Definition 7 (Inconsistency). A set of concept diagrams, D, is inconsis-
tent, if it has no models.
Note that every inconsistent diagram is also incoherent.
Diagrams in Figure 5 show antipatterns that lead to inconsistency. In the left
rule, we see that A and B are disjoint and then we assert that they have at least
one element, s1, in common. Both classes A and B are inconsistent in this case.
The right hand side rule shows an example of an inconsistent object property,
where we first have that the image of A under op is restricted to B, then we have
that the image is restricted to C, while B and C are disjoint non-empty sets.
3.3 Using Inference Rules to Detect Incoherence and Inconsistency
Having defined incoherence and inconsistency, we now design inference rules that
facilitate their detection. We derive proofs for Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 that show
that two sets of axioms are incoherent and inconsistent, respectively. To prove
these lemmas we design rules that step-by-step take us from the axioms to the
goal state in which the lemma is proved. These inference rules are general and
can then be used for similar reasoning cases in other ontologies. Our approach
to designing inference rules is driven by the requirements of the proof, rather
than in isolation from the proof. We believe that proof driven inference rules
give rise to more natural proofs. In contrast, the established common approach
to designing inference rules in logic is primarily driven by the requirements of
the theoretical properties (e.g., soundness and completeness) of the rules.
The following lemma shows that the set of axioms in Figure 6 is incoherent.
Lemma 1. Thunder is empty.
Fig. 5: Inconsistency examples.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
isEnhancedBy   1
SuperPower
isEnhancedBy
Thunder GodDevice
SuperPower
GodDevice
Device
Fig. 6: A set of incoherent axioms.
Proof. Figure 7 shows the proof.
In this proof (Figure 7), we aim to establish that “Thunder” is empty from
axioms in Figure 6. First, Axioms (c) and (d) are merged by using inference rule
cc. cc is one of existing rules for spider diagrams [8] and stands for copy contour
(contours in spider diagrams are equivalent to curves in concept diagrams) and is
introduced in [20]. Applying cc to diagram d copies the curve labelled “GodDe-
vice” from diagram (d) to diagram (c), giving diagram (e) as conclusion. In the
next step (e) and (a) are merged using cc twice in a row. “SuperPower” already
exists in (a), so the two curves being copied from (e) to (a), are “Device” and
“GodDevice”. The result of merging (e) and (a) gives (f). Next, (f) and (b) are
merged using rule mrg1 . This rule is formally defined in Definition 8.
Definition 8 (rule mrg1 ). Let d1 and d2 be two concept diagrams, each con-
taining an arrow, a1 and a2 respectively, labelled op such that
1. a1 is solid, its source is some boundary rectangle, ◻, and its target is a curve,
c1t in χ1t, which is an object and class property diagram;
2. a2 is dashed or solid and its source and target are curves c2s and c2t in χ2s
and χ2t, respectively, while c2t is properly contained in c3.
Also let χ1t in d1 contain curve c4 disjoint from c1t, such that c4 has the same
label as c3 in d2. Now let d3 be a concept diagram such that d3 is a copy of d1
with a new arrow, a3, and two new curves, c5, and c6 as follows:
1. c5 is added to the boundary rectangle that is the source of a1 in d1,
2. c5 has the same label as c2s in d2,
3. c6 is added inside c4 from d1,
4. c6 has the same label as c2t in d2,
5. a3 is sourced on c5 and targets c6, and
6. a3 has the same shape (dashed or solid), label and cardinality as a2 in d2.
Then diagrams d1 and d2 can be merged to form diagram d3 using rule mrg1 .
mrg1 is exemplified in Figure 8, where in the left hand premise c1t and c4
are represented by curves labelled A and B. On the right, c2s, c3, and c2t are
represented by curves labelled C, B, and D. In the conclusion, c5,and c6 are
represented by curves C and D.
isEnhancedBy
isEnhancedBy   1
(c) (d)
SuperPower
GodDevice
Device
(e)
SuperPower
(a)
SuperPower
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isEnhancedBy   1
Thunder GodDevice
(g)
(h)
Device
GodDevice
Device
GodDevice
Device
SuperPower
Thunder
Thunder
GodDevice
Device
SuperPower
Fig. 7: A proof of Lemma 1.
After merging (f) and (b) and deducing (g), the next inference rule used in
Figure 7 is incoh2, defined in Definition 9, and exemplified in Figure 4.
Definition 9 (rule incoh2). Let d be a concept diagram with two arrows a1
and a2 with the same label op, such that
1. a1 is solid, its source is some boundary rectangle and its target is curve c1t in
another boundary rectangle that frames concept and object property diagram
χt,
2. a2 is dashed or solid, its source is curve c2s whose label is in LC and which
is in the boundary rectangle that is the source of a1, its target is curve c2t in
χt and it is annotated with (◇, n) where ◇ ∈ {≥,=} and n ≥ 1,
3. c2t and c1t are disjoint.
Applying rule incoh2 to d gives d′, where d′, in its boundary rectangle, contains
a single curve c3 that is all shaded, contains no spiders and has the same label
as c2s in d.
Applying rule incoh2 to (g) gives (h), where “Thunder” is empty and there-
fore the lemma is proved and the set of axioms in Figure 6 is incoherent.
We now prove a lemma that shows that the set of axioms in Figure 9 is
inconsistent.
Fig. 8: Inference rule mrg1.
(m) (n) (o)
isMemberOf
AlienTeam
Robot
isMemberOf
HumanTeam
HumanTeamRobot
Fig. 9: A set of inconsistent axioms.
Lemma 2. Robot is inconsistent.
Proof. Figure 10 shows the proof.
In the proof, we aim to establish that “Robot” is inconsistent, using axioms
presented in Figure 9. The first inference rule used in Figure 10 merges Axioms
(m) and (n) using img5. This inference rule is exemplified in Figure 11. According
to this rule if we have two assertions stating the universal image of property op
as classes c1t and c2t, then they must represent the same set and therefore, all
the spiders in one belong to the other one too. Definition 10 formalises img5 and
the conditions under which it is applicable.
Definition 10 (rule img5). Let d1 and d2 be two concept diagrams, each con-
taining a solid arrow a1 and a2, labelled op, such that
(i) a1’s source is some boundary rectangle, and its target is curve c1t in χ1t,
where c1t is properly contained by some other curve c3,
(ii) a2’s source is some boundary rectangle, and its target is curve c2t in χ2t.
Let d3 be a copy of d2 with an additional curve c4, such that
(i) c4 is added to χ2t and it splits each existing zone into two, one inside and
one outside c4 except the zones inside c2t, which are not split but are all
inside c4, and
(ii) the label of c4 is the same as c3 in χ1t.
Diagram d2 can be merged with curve c3 from d1 to form d3 using rule img5.
By applying img5 to Axioms (m) and (n), we deduce diagram (q). Next,
applying rule del to (q) gives (r). del is one of the existing rules for concept
(m) isMemberOf
AlienTeam
Robot
(n) isMemberOf
HumanTeam
AlienTeam
Robot
HumanTeam
isMemberOf
(o)
HumanTeamRobot
(q)
Robot
HumanTeam
(r)
Fig. 10: A proof of Lemma 2.
diagrams that was explained in Section 3.1. Merging (r) with Axiom (o) is done
using inference rule incons1 (exemplified in Figure 5), that is described in Defi-
nition 11.
Definition 11 (rule incons1). Let d1 and d2 be two concept diagrams such that
there are two curves in d1, say c1 and c2, that are disjoint, while d2 contains
two curves c3 and c4 with at least one spider in their intersection. If c1 and c2
in d1 have the same labels as c3 and c4 in d2, respectively, rule incons1 spots
the inconsistency and concludes false ().
By applying incons1 to r and o, we deduce false, and spot the inconsistency of
“Robot” and hence the inconsistency of the set of axioms presented in Figure 9.
3.4 Correctness
Here, we investigate the soundness and completeness of the inference rules in-
troduced. Rules used in proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are cc, mrg1, incoh2,
img5, del and incons1. cc and del are proved sound in [5] and [20], respectively.
Due to space limitation, below we only prove the soundness of rule incoh2. Other
rules can be proven sound in a similar manner.
Theorem 1. Rule incoh2 (Definition 9) is sound.
Proof. (Sketch) We need to show that any model for the premise (d), is also a
model for the conclusion (d′). Let I = (U, .I) be an interpretation such that there
exists an extension, I ′ = (U, .I′) that shows I is a model for d. Then for the solid
arrow a1, the image of op
I′ equals λc(c1t)I′ . Due to the cardinality constraint,(◇, n), on a2, each element of λc(c2s)I′ is related to at least one element of
λc(c2t)I′ under opI′ . Suppose, for proof by contradiction, that λc(c2s)I′ ≠ ∅.
Let e ∈ λc(c2s)I′ and let e′ be an element in λc(c2t)I′ that e is related to under
opI
′
. Then e′ is an element of λc(c1t)I′ . So λc(c1t)I′ ∩ λc(c2t)I′ ≠ ∅. On the
Fig. 11: Inference rule img5.
other hand, since I is a model for d, and c1t and c2t are disjoint in d, we have
λc(c1t)I′ ∩ λc(c2t)I′ = ∅. Therefore the assumption that λc(c2s)I′ ≠ ∅ is false.
Consider now the only curve, c3, in d
′. Since λc(c) is a label in LC , any extension,
I ′′, of I clearly ensures λc(c3)I′′ = ∅. Since c3 is entirely shaded, I satisfies d′.
Hence, I is a model for d′, as required.
Ensuring completeness in most logical systems is hard. For a diagrammatic
logic for ontologies based on concept diagrams, the difficulty is caused by (i) the
existence of several syntactic elements for concept diagrams (e.g., spiders, curves,
shading, etc.); and (ii) the constant need to devise new rules to capture the infer-
ence required when reasoning about ontologies representing different domains.
We conjecture that concept diagrams, as defined here, correspond to a fragment
of second-order logic with one and two place predicates. One-place and two-place
predicates arise due to the use of labelled curves and arrows respectively. Second-
order (existential) quantification occurs through the use of unlabelled curves.
Although concept diagrams do not contain quantifiers in their syntax, an equiv-
alent fragment of SOL would need to do so. For instance, two non-overlapping
labelled curves, A and B say, give rise to (first-order) universal quantification
and express ∀x ¬(A(x)∧B(x)). Due to the restricted way in which second-order
quantification arises, finding a complete set of inference rules should be possible.
Compleness is a desirable property that we leave for future work (non-trivial).
Proving it involves considering and formalising variants of inference rules in all
combinations of all syntatic elements of concept diagrams. Consider inference
rule img5 presented in Figure 11. The variants of this rule can be defined for
other combination of arrows, when the target and source of arrows are various
combination of spiders, curves and boundary rectangles.
4 Related Work and Discussion
Debugging ontologies is a challenging task. A variety of tools, in particular vi-
sualisation tools [15, 16], have been developed to help ontology engineers with
the debugging process. Similar to these efforts, concept diagrams attempt to aid
debugging ontologies through visualisations. However, we argue that in addition
to having cognitive advantages over DL and OWL [13], concept diagrams are
cognitively more accessible than ontology visualisation methods based on node-
link diagrams (e.g., SOVA [15] and VOWL [16]). This can naturally be explained
by referring to better well-matchedness [10] of concept diagrams to ontologies.
Well-matchedness of a notation is assessed based on how well its syntax and se-
mantics mirror each other. Concept diagrams use syntactic spatial relationships
(e.g., curve containment) to reflect the corresponding semantics (e.g., subset re-
lation). In node-link diagrams classes and properties are represented as nodes,
while different arrow-like connectors are used to capture the relation between
the nodes. In contrast to concept diagrams, node-link diagrams use topological
relations to convey semantics (e.g., subset superset relation is expressed using
an arrow with a hollow end). The lack of well-matchedness in tools like [15, 16]
suggests that they may not be as cognitively effective as concept diagrams. In
addition to cognitive advantages, concept diagrams are fully formalised, which
is not the case for several ontology visualisation tools (e.g., UML diagrams [4]).
As a formalised logical system, concept diagrams can be used not only as a vi-
sualisation tool, but also as a reasoning tool, as it was highlighted in this paper.
Similar to our work, concept diagrams have recently been used for the de-
tection and justification of antipatterns [13]. However, in [13] the focus is on the
specification and representation of incoherence using concept diagrams rather
than the inference rules and the reasoning mechanism that checks incoherence.
In contrast, our goal is to design inference rules for reasoning. Moreover, we use
these inference rules for reasoning about both incoherence and inconsistency.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we described how to reason about inconsistency and incoherence
in ontologies using concept diagrams. Unlike, many visual tools for ontology
engineering [15, 16], concept diagrams are designed to be formal, yet accessible,
evidenced by empirical studies [13]. There are two alternatives to use concept
diagrams as ontology debugging tool, namely (i) to prove a one to one translation
of ontology axioms in concept diagrams; and (ii) to merge ontology axioms in a
single concept diagram.We focused on the latter. This choice was informed by
existing cognitive empirical evaluations [18, 13] and resulted in proposing a set
of sound inference rules for merging concept diagrams.
We conjecture that concept diagrams used in this paper (Section 2) are as
expressive as a fragment of second-order logic with one and two place predicates.
In the future we will extend the set of inference rules for this fragment with the
aim of achieving completeness.
We will use concept diagrams and their inference rules in building the first
mechanised reasoning system for concept diagrams and reasoning about ontolo-
gies. An exciting aspect of the future work from this perspective is the empirical
studies that we have outlined to inform the intuitiveness of the inference rules
we are implementing. We believe that the intuitiveness of the inference rules can
significantly contribute to a more accessible reasoner for ontology engineering.
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